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In 1984 the Navy implemented the Aircraft Service Period Adjustment
Program (ASPA) which was designed to induct aircraft into Standard Depot Level
Maintenance (SDLM) only after they fail to meet certain criteria during an
inspection. This thesis used regression analysis to explore the relationship between
time F-14A aircraft serve in tour and the direct costs of the corresponding SDLM.
Almost every year of ASPA, the average direct labor and material costs of
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In the current era of shrinking budgets, one of the premier challenges for the Navy
has been to identify resources for fleet modernization. One of the best potential sources
for these funds is reduction in the operating and support costs of naval units. Therefore,
much attention is being focused on the life-cycle costs of weapons systems. In the world
of Naval Aviation, Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) accounts for a significant
portion of an aircraft's life-cycle costs.
The purpose of SDLM is to correct corrosion and structural problems that cannot
be fixed at the organizational or intermediate levels of maintenance. Aircraft are inducted
into SDLM at the end of their Operating Service Period (OSP). The OSP is based on a
determination, through use of reliability centered maintenance, of how long the aircraft
can be operated safely without undergoing periodic depot-level maintenance. The OSP
defines the minimum period between SDLMs and provides the basis for planning,
programming, and budgeting this element of aircraft inventory management.
In 1991, the average cost of a Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM)
overhaul for the F-14 Tomcat was $1.87 million per aircraft. The standard work package
involved 154 structural inspections and 104 system performance checks. By 1993, the
average cost of a SDLM had risen to $2.65 million per aircraft. In 1994, the work
package was significantly reduced to just 83 structural inspections and 39 systems
performance checks, only 47% of the work requirements previously completed.
Interestingly enough, despite the marked decrease in work performed, the average cost
per aircraft rose to $3.24 million by the end of 1994. (Washington, 1996)
With statistics such as these, it is no wonder that there is concern regarding what is
driving the costs of overhauling aircraft to rise so dramatically. A popular belief is that the
adoption of the Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA) program in 1984 is the reason
for the increases (Ramsey & Legidakes, 1994, Washington, 1996).
The ASPA Program was designed to determine whether there is a need to induct
an aircraft into SDLM. Previously, an aircraft was inducted for SDLM at the end of its
OSP which for the F-14 is 56 months. The ASPA evaluation is an assessment of the
overall general material condition of an aircraft conducted by the depot responsible for the
type of airplane. The purpose of an ASPA inspection is to determine if the aircraft can be
deferred from SDLM induction and remain in service for an additional 12 months. ASPA
recognizes that all aircraft do not deteriorate at the same rate. Deterioration, expressed as
the state of aircraft material condition, is a consequence of environment, number of carrier
landings, catapult launches, operation cycles, and the quality of routine maintenance. The
ASPA program basically changes the basis for SDLM induction from "on-time" to "on-
condition."
Over time, Navy officials questioned whether the intended consequences of
ASPA— particularly the reduction in the number of SDLMs ~ were being outweighed by
difficulties in budgeting for future SDLM events and by increases in the amount of
maintenance performed when aircraft finally were inducted (Levy 2, 1993).
Supporters of the ASPA program argue that the program allows the Navy to save
depot money annually by preventing unnecessary induction into SDLM. On the other
hand, it has been argued that the proliferation of ASPA extensions has lead to an overall
deterioration of the material condition of aircraft by the time they are inducted into
SDLM. The degraded condition has in turn resulted in more extensive work being
required than planned for or budgeted. This is believed to drive the observed increased
costs for SDLM, which in turn have resulted in fewer aircraft being inducted into SDLM.
B. METHOD OF RESEARCH
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether there is a correlation between
the rising costs of F-14 SDLMs and the ASPA program. Through use of linear and
multiple regression models, it will examine the correlation between direct material and
direct labor costs and the amount of time an aircraft serves "in tour." While the standard
OSP for the F-14A is 56 months, as a result of the ASPA program, some aircraft have
served up to 104 months before being inducted into SDLM. This thesis will also examine
whether there is any correlation between costs and other factors, such as age and number
of flight hours, which could drive up the cost of SDLM.
C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The linear regression analysis shows a weak correlation between time spent in tour
and the direct costs of SDLM. However, time in tour was found to be statistically
insignificant in the multiple regression model. After identifying 1 1 potential variables that
may have affected the direct costs of SDLM, the only four explanatory variables which
were statistically significant were aircraft age, whether a modification was performed
concurrently, estimated labor hours to complete SDLM, and tour number.
Multiple ASPA deferrals for F-14As are not the norm. Fifty-two percent of all
aircraft that fail ASPA do so during the first inspection. Less than 23 percent of the
aircraft that fail ASPA do so after the second inspection.
The results of this analysis show that the increase in time that aircraft serve in tour
due to the ASPA program does not cause the cost of SDLM to increase.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II will provide background information regarding the Navy's aviation
maintenance structure, the ASPA program and work performed during SDLM.
Chapter III will describe the methodology employed for gathering data and
performing the analysis.
Chapter IV will present the findings of the analysis.
Chapter V will contain conclusions and recommendations.
II. DESCRIPTIONS OF ASPA AND SDLM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins with a discussion of the Navy's aviation maintenance
structure. It will also describe ASPA and the role it plays with regards to SDLM and the
management of SDLM.
B. AVIATION MAINTENANCE STRUCTURE
The Navy's aviation maintenance structure is designed around three levels of
effort, organizational being the lowest, followed by intermediate and depot. The Navy's
approach is to repair aeronautical equipment and material at the lowest practical
maintenance level. The program protects weapons systems from the inherently corrosive
environment in which they operate through an active corrosion control program, and it
promotes a systematic preventive maintenance schedule.
1. Organizational Maintenance
Organizational maintenance, also referred to as "O-level" maintenance, is
performed by an operational unit to keep assigned aircraft in a full mission-capable status,
while continually improving the local maintenance process. Maintenance at this level
includes scheduled maintenance, such as daily, preflight, postflight, conditional, and
phase aircraft inspections, all of which are considered preventive in nature. Conditional
inspections are unscheduled events which are required whenever an aircraft hits a specific
over-limit condition, such as a hard landing. The phase maintenance concept divides the
total scheduled maintenance requirement for an aircraft into small phases of
approximately the same work content. Completion of all the required phases at their
specified intervals completes the phase inspection cycle. (OPNAVINST 4790)
O-level maintenance also includes the unscheduled removal and replacement of
components by using squadron test equipment and hand tools in an effort to keep aircraft
in a full mission-capable status. Unscheduled maintenance hours are required to fix
systems and subsystems in the aircraft due to failures or indications of likely future
failure. (Stoll, 1993)
2. Intermediate Maintenance
Intermediate maintenance, also referred to as "I-level," is the responsibility of and
is performed by designated maintenance activities in support of using organizations
(OPNAVINST 4790.2F). I-level support consists of equipment material support both on
and off the aircraft, such as scheduled and unscheduled maintenance of components
removed at the organization level. This work includes related support equipment;
manufacture of some aeronautical components, liquids and gases; calibration of O-level
maintenance equipment; and technical assistance to O-level maintenance personnel.
3. Depot Maintenance
Depot maintenance, "D-level," is performed between operational service periods,
utilizing special structural inspections, to ensure the continued flying integrity of
airframes and flight systems. Depots provide rework of aviation parts, systems and
components and related support equipment. D-level maintenance includes manufacturing
items and component parts, making modifications, testing, inspecting, sampling, and
reclamation. Depots provide support services to the other levels, including professional
engineering, technology, and calibration services. The depots support the organizational
and intermediate level activities by providing technical assistance and carrying out those
functions which are beyond the responsibility or capability of the O or I level activities,
through the use of the depots' more extensive facilities, skills and materials. Depot level
services can be carried out in depots or in the field by personnel representing the depots.
(OPNAVINST 4790.2F)
C. THE AIRCRAFT SERVICE PERIOD ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
Each Type/Model/Series (t/m/s) of aircraft in the Navy has a normal tour length
defined by its Operating Service Period (OSP), which represents the standard cycle for
aircraft to be inducted into SDLM. A tour length is the elapsed calendar time from the
end of an aircraft's last SDLM until its induction for its next one. "The OSP for a t/m/s is
determined through the application of Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) and
sustained with age exploration" (NAVAIR 4730. 10A). Through 1983, it was Navy policy
to induct aircraft into aviation depots for major overhauls at the end of their OSPs.
In 1984, the Navy implemented the Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA)
program. "The ASPA philosophy is that depot level maintenance will be the result of a
deliberate action by an inspection team that has actually stood the aircraft at "parade rest"
rather than having maintenance occur as the result of the calendar" (Johannsen. 1985).
The ASPA evaluation cycle begins near the end of an aircraft's OSP, specifically the
aircraft's period end date (PED), which is the year and month the aircraft reaches the end
of its OSP. Recognizing that the material condition of all aircraft does not deteriorate at
the same pace, the objective of the ASPA evaluation is to determine if the aircraft can
remain in service through a 12-month PED adjustment. The effect of the ASPA program
has been to change the basis for SDLM induction from "on-time" to "on-condition." This
change has also resulted in more depot-level maintenance actions being processed in the
field (NAVAIR 4730. 10A).
The ASPA evaluations are conducted by a qualified depot level industrial Planner
and Estimator (P & E) team, utilizing approved Local Engineering Specification (LES).
An ASPA evaluation consists of a maintenance documentation review and a physical
examination of the aircraft. The inspection looks for leading indicators of corrosion or
other structural problems. The ASPA is not designed to produce a list of discrepancies
that, if corrected, would allow the aircraft to remain in tour another year.
D. STANDARD DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE
Aircraft are inducted into the depots for SDLM at the end of their OSP for
correction of corrosion and structural problems that cannot be fixed at the organizational
or intermediate levels of maintenance. During SDLM, an aircraft receives an extensive
tear down and evaluation to estimate the expected work to be completed.
Each aircraft type has a SDLM specification work package which identifies a
number of conditional (non-destructive) inspections to be performed on critical fatigue
areas. The required inspections are determined on the basis of systematic analysis of the
airframe, systems and component design, operational performance and reliability and
maintenance data. Although the rework accomplished during SDLM cannot make the
aircraft new again, it's purpose is to recover the material condition so the aircraft can go
back for another tour in the fleet (Levy 1, 1991).
Several components require mandatory maintenance performed on them at the end
of the aircraft tour length. Since 1994, the F-14A SDLM specifications included 83
structural inspections and 39 system performance checks (Washington, 1996). As a result
of these conditional inspections, over 413 components are also removed and either
remanufactured or replaced. Thus, roughly 63% of the aircraft's 650 components are
repaired or replaced during SDLM. The specifications are currently being rewritten and
will include an additional 24 system performance checks associated with the landing gear
which had been previously eliminated from the work package (Roberts, 1997).
This thesis will focus on the two primary variable inputs that are used to rework
aircraft airframes, labor man-hours and cost of materials. Although there are also some
overhead and general and administrative costs that support the work being done, they are
generally fixed costs and will not be addressed in the analysis.
There are several reasons for which an F-14A can be inducted into SDLM. The
most common is failing to be deferred following an ASPA inspection. The second reason
is that the aircraft hits a Time Compliance Requirement (TCR). In the case of the F-14A,
an aircraft will undergo a TCR modification when it reaches 5000 flight hours. An
aircraft will also be inducted for a TCR modification if it is approaching its fatigue life
expended (FLE) threshold. Fatigue life expended is a function of operational tempo and
includes numbers of catapult shots, landings and flight hours. The F-14A FLE threshold
is 82% of its total calculated fatigue life. If an aircraft is approaching the 5000 hour mark
or FLE of 82% and is currently operating under an ASPA extension, it may be inducted
into the depot for the modification and SDLM concurrently.
During SDLM, it is estimated that 75% of all man-hours expended occur during
the disassembly, reassembly and test of the aircraft. Less than 25% of all man-hours go
towards correcting all categories of discrepancies. (Roberts, 1997). Currently, the
average time to complete a SDLM on an F-14A is 363 days (Alexander, 1996).
The materials cost varies from one overhaul to the other. Presently, whenever a
component needs to be replaced, it is reworked concurrently. Rarely is a new one bought
commercially. This practice, however, is in the process of changing. A new initiative is
coming on line in which 150 items which were previously reworked concurrently will be
purchased through the Navy supply system. If the net cost, price plus surcharge, of an
item is less than the cost of rework, then the item is purchased. Although materials costs
may rise somewhat, the overall cost of SDLM is expected to decrease through a 1 5%
decrease in turn around time (TAT). Currently, approximately $1.8 million is spent on
reworking parts during SDLM. An estimated $600,000 is expected to be saved through
this new initiative. (Roberts, 1997)
The first F-14 requiring SDLM was inducted into the Navy Aviation Depot
(NADEP), Norfolk in 1975. The SDLM effort became dual-sited in 1982, when NADEP
North Island commenced overhauls on F-14s. In 1991 the decision was made to single-
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site the SDLMs in Norfolk. NADEP North Island completed its last F-14 overhaul in
April 1992. In 1993 the Base Realignment and Closure Committee (BRAC) decided to
close NADEP Norfolk. As a result, F-14 SDLMs are conducted primarily at NADEP
Jacksonville, which inducted its first Tomcat in October, 1994. (Washington, 1996) To
date, 10 of 25 aircraft inducted have been delivered from NADEP Jacksonville.
Until 1995, F-14s had been overhauled exclusively at Navy depots. In the fall of
1995, the first of five aircraft was inducted for SDLM at Grumman in St. Augustine,
Texas and only 1 has been completed to date. For purposes of this analysis, only those
SDLMs conducted at NADEPs will be included.
The multiple sources of F-14 overhauls may have contributed to the variability in
the costs of SDLM. In addition, the frequent changes of SDLM sites may have prevented
the realization of savings associated with the "learning curve" effect. Both of these issues
will be addressed in Chapter III.
E. ASPA DEFERRAL RATES
As mentioned earlier, the ASPA program basically changes the basis of SDLM
induction from "on-time" to "on-condition." Since 1985, deferral rates for the F-14 have
ranged from 72% to 86%. Table 1 contains the deferral rates from 1985 to 1996.
All deferral and failure rates were calculated from the F-14 ASPA historical database maintained by
Naval Air Systems Command Industrial Capabilities Department in Patuxent River, MD.
Table 1 . ASPA deferral rates f<>rF-14A
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Deferral Rate 72 73 53 78 73 73 80 78 75 86 76 76
No. of Aircraft 36 44 32 49 63 70 64 37 53 88 92 42
Inspected
These deferrals would seem to indicate that aircraft serve longer periods between
SDLMs. Table 2 shows the deferral rate by inspection number and tour number. The first
ASPA inspection (ASPA 1) occurs at the end of the aircraft's OSP. The "ASPA 2"
column represents the number of aircraft that have been deferred for one 1 2 month
period. Most aircraft which are deferred for two times or more are in their first tour.
Table 2. Deferral rate by ASPA inspection number and tour number
ASPA 1 ASPA 2 ASPA 3 ASPA 4 ASPA 5
Tour 1 92 88 66 82 33
No. aircraft inspected 100 78 35 11 9
Tour 2 72 71 44 67
No. aircraft inspected 82 34 16 6 2
Tour 3 74 82 68 50 N/A
No. aircraft inspected 114 66 22 4
Tour 4 76 55 100 N/A N/A
No. aircraft inspected 33 11 3
Tour 5 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A
No. aircraft inspected 1
This table illustrates that the greater the tour number, the fewer number of extensions the
aircraft can expect to have. This is to be expected since the aircraft continues to age
through successive tours.
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Although the high deferral rates may lead one to believe that aircraft undergo
multiple deferrals prior to induction, not all aircraft that pass one inspection are inspected
for an additional deferral. For example, only 66 percent of the aircraft that passed their
first inspection were inspected for a second deferral. As mentioned earlier in this chapter,
some aircraft that are deferred are still inducted into the depot for TCR modifications and
SDLM would be performed concurrently. Table 3 shows the deferral rate by ASPA
inspection number. The deferral rates are high for aircraft undergoing their first and
second inspection, but the number of aircraft inspected and the deferral rate is lower for
Table 3. ASPA deferral rates by inspection number






Number of 370 191 76 21 11
Aircraft Inspected
Deferral Rate 79 80 63 71 27
subsequent inspections. An important observation is that of the 370 aircraft ever
inspected for ASPA deferrals, less than 42 percent have passed a second inspection and
less than 1 3 percent have passed a third.
Table 4 contains the percentage ofASPA inspection failures by inspection
number. This table shows that of the 154 ASPA failures, 52 percent occurred during the
first inspection. The failure rate by ASPA inspection number shows that only 23 percent
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of the aircraft that are inducted into SDLM, because of failing an ASPA inspection,
served two or more additional 12 month periods.
Table 4. ASPA inspection failures
ASPA Inspection ASPA 1 ASPA 2 ASPA 3 ASPA 4 ASPA 5
"Percent of total failures 52 21 18 4 5
Number of failures 80 32 28 6 8
This table indicates that less than 50 percent of all aircraft which are inducted into
SDLM for failing ASPA spend additional time in tour prior to failing ASPA. This implies
that longer tour lengths aren't as prevalent as previously believed.
Although the average time in tour may not be increasing greatly, there has been a
marked increase in the direct labor and materials costs of the average SDLM. Table 5
shows the changes in direct labor hours and direct materials costs for aircraft inducted
into SDLM from 1985 to 1995. All costs were converted to fiscal year 1996 dollars for
Table 5. Average SDLM direct labor and materials costs















In 1987 there was a drop in direct labor costs due to the introduction of
competition into the F-14 SDLM process. As a potential cost saving measure, NADEPs
Norfolk and North Island let private contractors bid on SDLM work for specified aircraft.
This resulted in major changes in the actual repair work and accounting procedures so
that costs would remain low. (Levy, 1, 1991) The effect of this competition was short-
lived, for by 1 989 the costs had started rising again. The decrease in total costs from
1993 to 1994 reflects the reduction in SDLM specifications that occurred during this
timeframe.
Table 6 contains the average direct labor and material costs according to the
number ofASPA deferrals aircraft received prior to SDLM induction. The table shows
that the average direct costs increase with the number of deferrals an aircraft receives
Table 6. Average direct costs of SDLM based upon number of deferrals
Number of Deferrals 12 3
Average Direct Labor Costs $484,103 $497^498 $6377572 $453,263
Average Direct Material Costs 564,211 576,856 755,762 767.996
Average Total Direct Costs 1,048,315 1,074,354 1,393,334 1,221,260
Number of Aircraft 59 43 23 4
prior to SDLM. The difference in costs are not very significant between no deferrals and
one deferral. However, there is a marked increase from one deferral to two or more
deferrals. This indicates that there is some increase in the direct costs of SDLM for
aircraft that spend additional time in service due to ASPA deferrals.
15
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m. DATA COLLECTION AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the methodology used to develop the models necessary to
study the correlation between the number of ASPA deferrals that an aircraft receives and
the costs incurred during SDLM.
B. DATA COLLECTION
1. Production Performance Reports
The source for obtaining labor man-hours and materials costs for each SDLM
included in this study was the Production Performance Reports (PPRs) which each depot
sends to Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Aircraft Division (formerly known as
Naval Aviation Depot Operations Center), at Naval Air Station, Patuxent River,
Maryland. The depots use the PPRs to document the work performed during SDLM.
Information contained in the PPR includes the aircraft's bureau number, induction year,
physical completion date, depot completing the work, actual days at the depot, estimated
labor hours required based on SDLM specifications, total actual hours expended on the
aircraft, direct labor costs and direct materials costs. In addition, subprogram codes are
listed.
Subprogram codes are used to identify the type of work completed during a
specific rework action. For example, a subprogram code of 36 indicates a SDLM without
major modifications, whereas a code 38 indicates a SDLM with modifications.
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Theoretically, there should be little difference in the number of hours expended between
the two types of subprograms, because the hours used for the modifications are charged to
another subprogram code (41 or 43). (Levy 1, 1991) However, there are known
difficulties in assigning costs to the appropriate account. This will be addressed in Chapter
IV
The work standard refers to the estimated number of hours required to complete
the overhaul based upon the SDLM specification. Beginning in 1993, shortly after
NADEP Norfolk was placed on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) list,
maintenance of the work standards was less than optimal, as technicians became focused
on preparing to move operations to NADEP Jacksonville. Although the values may be
understated, the work standards still provided the best estimate available for comparison
and were included in this analysis.
There have also been problems with dual recording in the PPR. Duplicate records
and incomplete records were deleted prior to performing calculations for this thesis.
2. ASPA Inspection Database for F-14As
The ASPA historical database, maintained by the Industrial Capabilities
Department ofNAVATR, also in Patuxent River, MD, was used to determine what tour an
aircraft was in and how many deferrals it had received prior to being inducted to SDLM.
A tour minus one represents how many times an aircraft has been through SDLM. For
example, an aircraft on its first tour (tour one) hasn't been through SDLM. An aircraft on
its second tour has been through one SDLM, third tour-two SDLMs, and so on.
18
As noted earlier, the most common reason for an aircraft to be inducted into
SDLM is failure to receive an ASPA deferral. In addition, aircraft requiring a Time
Compliance Requirement (TCR) modification can be inducted without having failed an
ASPA inspection. The data used in the analysis contained aircraft inducted into SDLM
due to failing ASPA inspections as well as requiring TCR modifications. In addition,
some aircraft were inducted without failing ASPA or requiring TCR modifications, but
because of operational requirements.
Although the ASPA program officially came on line in 1984, data regarding the
results of ASPA inspections was not centrally maintained until 1988. As a result, few
records exist regarding the results ofASPA inspections between 1984 and 1988 Of the
460 records of SDLMs which were conducted since 1984, data regarding what tour
number and how many ASPA deferrals an aircraft had received prior to induction was
available for only 129 of the SDLM events. An attempt was made to obtain that
information from other sources, but it was unsuccessful. As a result, the population used
in the statistical analysis described in Chapter IV consists of those 129 records which were
verifiable. Of those 129 SDLMs, 44 of the aircraft were inducted without having failed an
ASPA inspection. The data compiled from the PPRs and ASPA inspection database
which was used for the linear regression analysis were compiled into a spreadsheet which
is presented in Appendix A. The entire ASPA database was used to determine the deferral
rates contained in Chapter II and the failure statistics contained in Chapter IV.
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3. Aviation Maintenance Material Management (3M) Data
The Aviation 3M Data Collection System was used to collect information
regarding other potential explanatory variables for use in constructing multiple regression
models. The following information was collected for a sample of 81 aircraft:
- aircraft age, which is the time in months from acceptance into the Navy to the
SDLM date
- number of flight hours for the 24 months prior to SDLM
- number of ship flight hours for 24 months before SDLM
- total number of flight hours since previous SDLM
- total unscheduled maintenance man-hours per flight hour for 24 months prior to
SDLM
4. Price Indexes
In order to remove the effects of inflation, price indexes were obtained to
normalize the data by displaying all costs in fiscal year 1996 constant dollars. Direct
materials costs were normalized using Annual Price Change (APC) rates obtained from
Navy Supply. Materials prices in the Navy Supply system are known to vary greatly from
year to year, and these rates help capture that fluctuation. Direct labor costs were
normalized using the Operation & Maintenance Civilian Pay Raise index which is




To analyze the correlation between number of ASPA deferrals and the cost of
SDLM, several linear and multiple regression models were developed. To perform the
necessary regression analysis, the MINITAB Statistical Analysis package was used.
1. Linear Regression
The value of the linear regression model is that it demonstrates the relationship
between two variables, such as costs and time in tour. Linear regression models were
constructed using direct labor costs, direct materials costs and total direct costs as the
dependent variables. It is important to look at the total because it is possible for a repair
effort to be performed and accounted for in two different ways. For example, if a specific
part requires replacement, it is possible for that part to be either reworked in a back shop
at the depot or purchased through the supply system. In the first case, that would cause
an increase in labor costs; the second case would mean an increase in materials costs.
Using the total of direct costs neutralizes this effect. At the same time, it is important to
see how both labor and materials costs are affected separately. Each of the dependent
variables was regressed against the months in tour. As mentioned earlier, the standard
tour length is 56 months, each ASPA deferral extends that period for an additional 12
months.
2. Multiple Regression
Three multiple regression models were constructed, also using direct labor costs,
direct materials costs and total direct costs as the dependent variables. In addition to the
number of months in tour, additional explanatory variables were added in an effort to
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enhance the model and explain the observed variation in the costs of SDLM. A total of
1 1 potential explanatory variables were identified. These variables were selected based
upon their potential to affect the cost of SDLM. The explanatory variables used were:
- Time in tour, expressed in months
- Aircraft age, expressed in months
- Result of latest ASPA inspection (fail or pass)
- Tour number
- Depot where SDLM took place
- Modification, if one was performed concurrently with the SDLM
- Work standard, estimate of labor hours required for SDLM
- Total flight hours since last SDLM
- Flight hours for 24 months prior to SDLM
- Ship flight hours for 24 months prior to SDLM
- Total unscheduled maintenance man-hours per flight hour since last SDLM
Age of aircraft was selected because it is important to know to what extent age
causes additional SDLM costs. Whether or not an aircraft failed an ASPA inspection
prior to induction could also affect the costs of SDLM. It is logical to think that those
aircraft which fail an inspection are in worse material condition than those that don't,
therefore driving up costs due to increased workload Failure was represented in the
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model using a categorical variable. A value of one was used to indicate that an aircraft
failed ASPA and zero was used to indicate that it didn't fail.
What tour an aircraft is in may affect the costs of SDLM. As mentioned before,
the tour number is one greater than the number of SDLMs an aircraft had previously
undergone. Higher tour numbers mean more SDLMs over the aircraft's life, which in turn
could mean lower SDLM costs because the aircraft is seen more frequently. Tours were
represented using categorical variables.
The depot where the SDLM took place was selected to capture the inherent
differences between NADEPs Norfolk and North Island. Such differences include
accounting procedures and skill level of depot workers. Depots were represented using a
categorical variable. Norfolk was represented with a value of one and North Island was
represented with a value of zero.
Work standards generally vary from year to year in conjunction with the changes in
SDLM specifications. Work standard is an estimate of the labor hours needed to complete
a SDLM. As such, work standards could be expected to impact the cost of SDLM.
Information regarding flight hours was included to see what extent flying from
both on and off aircraft carriers affects the cost of SDLM. Unlike the Air Force's premier
fighter, the F-15, which is land-based, the F-14 operates in an extremely harsh
environment on board ship.
Unscheduled maintenance man-hours per flight hour (UMMHpFH) was selected as
an explanatory variable in that a higher rate of these hours could indicate a more degraded
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level of material condition, therefore affecting the level ofwork to be performed and
ultimately costs.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the correlation between the different costs within a
SDLM and the number of months that an aircraft is in tour prior to being inducted into
SDLM, with the understanding that repeated ASPA deferrals lead to increases in the tour
length of an aircraft. The chapter will begin with an overview of statistical terms pertinent
to understanding the regression analysis performed. Finally, the results of the linear and
multiple regression models will be discussed in detail.
B. STATISTICAL TERMINOLOGY USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS
When analyzing the results obtained from a regression analysis, there are three
statistical values which are of great interest to the statistician or manager for determining
the validity of a regression model. The first of these values is the t-ratio for the coefficient
of the explanatory variable. A high t-ratio indicates that the explanatory variable (also
referred to as the independent variable) is important in explaining the value of the
dependent variable. For an independent variable to be statistically significant at the 95
percent confidence level, its t-ratio must be higher than the critical value, which is
generally around two.
The second statistical value of importance is the F-ratio. The F-ratio is a measure
of how well the selected set of explanatory variables model the system. If the F-ratio of a
regression model is less than the critical value (approximately four at a 95 percent
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confidence level), then the chosen set of explanatory variables do not correctly model the
system.
The most significant use of the F-ratio in regression analysis is to check the
statistical significance of the third value of importance, the coefficient of determination, or
R-squared as it is commonly called. The R-squared value measures the percentage of the
variability in the dependent variable that can be explained by the regression line (Liao,
1996). Values for R-squared range from zero to 100 percent. R-squared values close to
zero indicate a weak relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables, values
close to 100 indicate a strong correlation As mentioned previously, the statistical
significance of the R-squared value is measured by the F-ratio.
C. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
1. Linear Regression Models
Table 7 contains the results of the linear regressions performed using the time in
tour alone to explain the variation in the direct labor and materials costs and their total.
Table 7 R^
Dependent variable a b t-ratio, a t-ratio, b F-ratio R-squared
Direct labor costs 301,084 3^589
Direct materials costs 195,554 6,436
Total direct costs 496,638 10,025
3.63 2.89 8.33 6.1%
1.08 2.38 5.66 4.2%
2.00 2.69 7.5 5.4%
The value in the "a" column represents the constant term in the regression equation. The
"b" value represents the coefficient of the dependent variable in the equation As
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mentioned earlier, the t-ratio, F-ratio and R-squared values indicate the statistical
significance of the models.
In the equation using direct labor costs as the dependent variable, the "t-ratio b" is
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level and therefore signifies that the
explanatory variable, time in tour, plays a role in explaining the direct labor costs The
corresponding R-squared, however, shows that time in tour only explains about 6.
1
percent of the total variation in direct labor costs. Therefore, the results indicate that
there is a weak correlation between time in tour and direct labor costs of SDLM.
Like the regression equation for direct labor costs, the results of the linear
regression models for direct materials costs and total direct costs, which are also
statistically significant, indicate that there is little correlation between an aircraft's time in
tour and the costs of its SDLM.
2. Multiple Regression Models
Three multiple regression models were constructed using direct labor costs, direct
material costs and total direct costs as the dependent variables. Initially, a model was
constructed for each using the 1 1 potential explanatory variables that were previously
identified. However, only four of the variables were found to be statistically significant.
The results of these initial models are presented in Appendix C. The variables found to be
statistically significant were aircraft age, whether a modification was performed
concurrently, tour number and work standard. These variables were significant for all
three models, but time in tour was not.
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a. Direct Labor Costs
Table 8 contains the results of the final regression equation for direct labor
costs. The t-ratios indicate that each of the variables are important in explaining the
variation in direct labor costs.
Table 8. Results of regression equation for direct labor costs













R-squared = 46.2% F-ratio = 12.86
Although this model is statistically significant, the R-squared value
indicates that it only explains 46.2% of the variation in direct labor costs. It is not
surprising that aircraft age is statistically significant. It is intuitive that, as an aircraft ages,
the cost of maintaining and repairing it will increase.
One interesting observation is the "modification" variable. The sign of the
coefficient for the modification variable indicates that those aircraft which have
modifications installed concurrently experience lower direct labor costs. A potential
explanation for this is that overhaul efforts are being charged to the modification account.
As mentioned in Chapter II, modifications are funded separately from SDLMs. SDLMs
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are funded with Operating and Maintenance dollars, while modifications are paid for with
Procurement dollars.
Another interesting observation in this model is the value of the coefficients
for the tour variables. As mentioned in Chapter III, the tour number was represented
using "dummy" variables. Each category, in this case tour number, was treated as a
separate variable. When constructing an equation for categorical variables, the number of
dummy variables used is one less than the number of categories in the data. The dummy
variables created reflected whether the aircraft was on first tour, second tour, or third or
fourth tour. The third and fourth tour were grouped together because of the low number
of observations of aircraft in a fourth tour.
Aircraft in a first tour were coded "1,0" where the first value corresponds
with the "Tour 1" variable, second value with the "Tour 2" variable. Aircraft in their
second tour were coded "0,1" and those in their third or fourth tour were coded "0,0."
The values for the coefficients of the "Tour" variables indicate that direct
labor costs for aircraft are greatest for aircraft in their first tour, followed by aircraft in
their second tour. This is possibly due to the fact that most aircraft which serve multiple
12 month deferrals prior to SDLM induction do so in their first or second tour
b. Direct materials costs
The results of the regression model for direct material costs are similar to
those of direct labor. The statistics for the direct material costs are contained in Table 9.
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Like the direct labor model, direct material costs increase with aircraft age and work
standard and decrease in successive tours. Also like the labor model, direct materials
Table 9. Results of regression equation for direct materials costs




Work Standard 71 4.59
Tour 1 435060 3.04
Tour 2 322200 3.43
R-squared = 50.7% F-ratio = 15.44
costs are lower if a modification is performed concurrent with SDLM. The R-squared
value indicates that this model explains 50.7% of the variation in direct materials costs.
c. Total Direct Costs
As mentioned in Chapter III, it is important to look at a model for total
direct costs to offset the two different approaches which can be taken to fix a component.
One approach is to rework the component and the other is to buy a new component. The
first method affects labor costs and the second affects material costs. The results of the
total direct costs model is displayed in Table 10. The higher value for R-squared indicates
that this model was able to capture some of the variation in total costs due to the different
approaches to fixing components. It also indicates that this model is slightly better for































d. Comparison between Direct Labor Costs and Direct Material Costs
Each coefficient (also called parameter) value represents the change in the
dependent variable (either direct labor or material costs) for a one-unit change in the
corresponding explanatory variable. To compare the effects of the different explanatory
variables, the percentage change in the dependent variable was calculated by dividing the
parameter value obtained from the regression by the mean value of the dependent variable.
(Levy, 1, 1991) Table 1 1 illustrates these results for direct labor and material costs.
Table 1 1 . Estimated effects on direct labor





Work standard 6E-05 9.8E-05
Tour 1 0.49403 0.60307
Tour 2 0.25492 0.44663
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The results show that the effects of each of the explanatory variables are stronger for
direct material costs than direct labor costs. The results also show that tour number had
the strongest effect on costs relative to the other variables. Modifications had the second
strongest effect.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has described the history of the ASPA program, ASPA deferral rates
and SDLM costs for the F-14A. The analysis focused on the relationship between SDLM
costs and the time an aircraft served in tour. In addition, the analysis explored the
relationship between the direct labor and material costs of SDLM and other factors which
may cause costs to increase. The following can be concluded:
1
.
Although the average direct costs of F-14A SDLMs increased with the
number of deferrals, results of the regression analysis show that the correlation between
time in tour and SDLM costs is weak. The combination of aircraft characteristics
represented by the explanatory variables in the multiple regression model better explain the
cost variation than simply focusing on a single measure such as the number of ASPA
inspections.
2. Aircraft age, whether a modification was performed concurrently, work
standard and tour number help explain the variation in the direct costs of SDLM
However, only 57.5 percent of the variation in the total directs costs of SDLM can be
explained by these variables.
3. More than two ASPA deferrals prior to induction to SDLM is not the
norm. Most aircraft that fail ASPA do so on their first inspection. Less than 13 percent
of the 510 aircraft extensions granted were for third, fourth or fifth extensions.
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4. It is extremely difficult to predict the costs for completing a SDLM with
any accuracy. There is great variation in the estimated hours required to perform SDLM
(represented by the work standard) and the actual number of hours it takes to complete it.
This is reflected in the complexity of the regression model created.
B. RECOMMENDATION
Although this thesis determined that the extended time in tour due to ASPA was
not driving the cost of SDLM to rise, that is not to say that other features of the ASPA
program don't contribute to the variation in the costs of SDLM. As mentioned earlier,
one of the effects of the ASPA program is that it interferes with the ability of the Navy to
plan, program and budget for SDLM events. It is in this light that the ASPA program
should be reviewed to determine whether it is in the best interest of the Navy.
C. FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis attempted to identify those variables which explain the variation in the
direct labor and material costs for F-14A SDLMs. The variables used in this analysis
captured only 57.5 percent of the total variation in costs. It would be useful for prediction
purposes to identify additional variables to create a model that captures more of the
variation. Such a model would also help in understanding the impact of different variables
on the SDLM process in terms of cost.
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APPENDIX A
DATA COMPILED FROM PPR AND ASPA DATABASE
BUNO IY TOUR ASPA FAILED
ASPA
DEPOT SUB DLC DMC
159013 85 3 1 YES B 38 276727 320810
159018 85 3 1 YES C 38 473401 404038
159438 85 3 1 YES B 38 274911 371085
159449 85 3 1 YES B 38 281885 414470
161139 85 1 1 YES B 38 246920 380466
161158 85 1 1 YES B 38 255756 331095
161160 85 1 1 YES B 38 272767 330531
158991 86 3 1 YES C 38 385596 353312
159002 86 3 1 YES C 38 371185 267448
159425 86 3 1 YES B 38 322623 386767
159429 86 3 1 YES B 38 341775 510004
159845 86 2 2 YES C 38 339784 366778
160379 86 4 2 YES B 38 295577 387226
160397 86 2 1 YES B 38 309806 305097
160409 86 2 1 YES B 38 286241 390428
161145 86 1 2 YES B 38 276383 319307
161161 86 1 2 YES B 38 288181 387851
161271 86 1 2 YES C 38 329959 297056
159004 87 3 1 YES B 38 236206 211479
159015 87 3 2 YES B 38 266567 221449
159016 87 3 1 YES B 38 228174 282647
159023 87 3 1 YES B 38 264481 241985
159423 87 3 1 YES B 38 229889 220426
159424 87 3 2 YES C 38 255982 175724
159444 87 3 1 YES B 38 263096 223606
159825 87 2 2 YES C 38 296298 201313
160391 87 2 2 YES B 38 269740 308764
160404 87 2 1 YES B 38 248588 233624
160664 87 2 1 YES C 38 230281 208465
160668 87 2 1 YES C 38 321983 323346
161274 87 1 3 YES C 38 249712 239563
161296 87 1 1 YES C 38 247494 251053
161299 87 1 2 YES C 38 268290 532501
161443 87 1 1 YES C 38 244438 186992
159597 88 3 1 YES B 38 292744 668044
159856 88 2 1 YES C 38 258931 222167
160657 88 2 1 YES C 38 279671 325112
160690 88 2 1 YES C 38 380512 566093
160896 88 2 1 YES B 38 252337 322180
160917 88 2 1 YES B 38 291619 357016
160919 88 2 1 YES B 38 313326 302467
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BUNO IY TOUR ASPA FAILED
ASPA
DEPOT SUB DLC DMC
161297 88 1 2 YES C 38 342542 362400
161298 88 1 2 YES C 38 284672 303447
161292 89 1 3 YES c 38 525472 142533
158623 90 3 3 NO c 38 523750 488757
158978 90 3 4 YES c 38 405739 429162
158999 90 3 3 YES c 38 439754 368803
159025 90 4 YES c 38 423025 430384
159454 90 4 YES B 36 494530 604315
159457 90 3 YES B 36 432025 439952
159606 90 3 YES B 36 518799 639533
159828 90 3 NO C 38 380987 488212
159849 90 3 YES C 38 597752 840702
160681 90 2 YES C 38 475277 361895
160693 90 2 NO B 38 525005 486572
161147 90 2 YES B 36 383462 325671
161150 90 2 YES B 36 355539 332760
161164 90 2 YES B 36 358414 421740
161276 90 2 YES B 38 589966 796746
161281 90 2 YES B 36 402954 509074
161598 90 2 NO C 38 377112 461884
161616 90 1 NO C 38 498853 428537
161850 90 2 NO B 36 413661 355653
161853 90 3 YES B 36 312656 399229
161857 90 2 NO B 36 398832 341123
161859 90 2 NO B 36 571223 561667
161861 90 2 YES B 36 448117 428933
161869 90 2 YES B 38 327543 245331
159868 91 3 2 YES B 38 730776 420843
160390 91 3 YES B 36 532524 464568
160403 91 3 YES B 36 703916 1087946
160411 91 3 YES B 36 538866 645358
160679 91 3 YES C 38 620481 586656
161271 91 2 YES B 38 561860 533020
161284 91 2 2 YES B 36 545045 826597
161612 91 2 NO C 38 623178 692877
161619 91 3 NO B 38 549940 400547
161622 91 2 NO B 38 646201 551294
161626 91 2 NO B 38 583352 532163
161855 91 2 NO B 36 507994 474388
161858 91 2 NO B 36 493962 610794
161860 91 2 NO B 36 502466 681834
161862 91 2 NO B 38 515551 509992
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BUNO IY TOUR ASPA FAILED
ASPA
DEPOT SUB DLC DMC
161864 91 1 2 YES B 38 493314 524303
162591 91 1 1 YES C 38 546952 523531
162705 91 1 2 YES B 38 469756 389837
160382 92 3 3 YES B 36 615330 550492
160407 92 3 2 YES B 36 624167 590394
161134 92 3 1 NO B 36 564437 1299196
161139 92 2 1 NO B 36 639311 813168
161152 92 2 2 YES B 36 732444 1130224
161285 92 2 3 YES B 36 679316 689093
161603 92 3 YES B 36 632441 614948
161607 92 3 NO B 36 491725 602702
161609 92 3 YES B 36 600735 506284
161615 92 3 YES B 36 627858 747968
161618 92 3 NO B 36 555658 654046
161621 92 3 YES B 36 604480 843760
162590 92 2 YES B 38 558569 391161
162594 92 2 NO B 36 553132 595334
162597 92 2 NO B 36 596717 567114
162599 92 2 YES B 36 530483 434861
162602 92 2 NO B 36 588595 576028
162603 92 2 NO B 36 474947 365524
162692 92 3 YES B 36 537312 566071
162693 92 3 YES B 36 543933 453443
158629 93 3 1 YES B 36 778933 1214726
158637 93 3 1 YES B 36 759990 1508618
159867 93 3 1 YES B 36 704717 1367451
160915 93 3 2 YES B 36 723641 1484585
160926 93 3 1 YES B 36 715507 975458
161160 93 2 1 NO B 36 581769 1590225
161282 93 2 3 YES B 36 656956 1332893
161620 93 3 YES B 36 933969 1439847
162592 93 2 NO B 36 619980 828010
162598 93 2 NO B 36 566510 787851
162606 93 2 NO B 36 539828 756446
162688 93 4 YES B 36 601955 1041853
162696 93 2 NO B 36 582748 765181
162699 93 3 YES B 36 508539 876770
162704 93 4 YES B 36 564989 1331978
159845 94 3 2 YES B 36 742067 1159941
160669 94 3 3 YES B 36 718139 1161319
160902 94 2 3 YES B 36 645456 1595340
160925 94 2 3 YES B 36 876834 1091743
37
BUNO IY TOUR ASPA FAILED
ASPA
DEPOT SUB DLC DMC
161141 94 3 1 YES B 36 710655 692752
161162 94 2 4 YES B 36 119309 143234
161274 94 2 1 YES B 36 759219 922174
161617 94 1 3 NO B 36 697076 716770
162689 94 1 5 YES B 36 609165 1067307
BUNO - Aircraft Bureau Number
IY - Fiscal year inducted into SDLM
Tour - Tour number when inducted into SDLM
ASPA - Most recent ASPA inspection prior to induction to SDLM
FAILED ASPA - Whether or not the aircraft failed ASPA prior to SDLM
DEPOT - NADEP where SDLM performed
B - Norfolk
C- North Island
SUB - Subprogram code
36 - SDLM no modifications
38- SDLM with modifications
DLC - Direct Labor Costs
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USING 11 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
1. Regression Analysis for Direct Labor Costs
The regression equation is
Direct Labor Costs = - 592060 - 35419 Failed +1038 TIME IN TOUR
- 3645 Norfolk - 94450 Modification + 35.8 Work Standard
+ 242489 TOUR_l + 145461 TOUR_2 + 2831 Age - 1.9 FltHours
- 9.2 Flight Hours -24 + 104 Ship Flight Hours -24 - 0.60 UMMHpFH
Predictor Coef StDev t-ratio P
Constant -592060 230685 -2.57 0.012
Failed -35419 40260 -0.88 0.382*
TIME IN 1038 1642 0.63 0.529*
Norfolk -3645 49322 -0.07 0.941*
Modification -94450 34412 -2.74 0.008
Work Standard 35.807 7.835 4.57 0.000
TOUR 1 242489 88208 2.75 0.008
TOUR2 145461 47721 3.05 0.003
Age 2831.1 700.6 4.04 0.000
TotFltHours -1.86 32.25 -0.06 0.954*
Flight Hours-24 -9.15 98.86 -0.09 0.927*
Ship Flight Hours 104.1 110.5 0.94 0.350*
UMMHpFH -0.600 3.657 -0.16 0.870*
S = 113439 R-Sq = 47.7% R-Sq(adj) = 38.5% F -ratio = 5.18
Coef- Coefficient of explanatory variable
StDev - Standard deviation for explanatory variable
P - Probability of error for saying the t-ratio is significant
*
- indicates that corresponding t-ratio insignificant at 95% confidence level
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2. Regression Analysis for Direct Materials Costs
The regression equation is
Direct Material Costs = - 1222738 - 102978 Failed + 500 TIME IN TOUR
- 65713 Norfolk - 312629 Modification + 67.0 Work Standard
+ 318815 TOUR_l + 301546 TOUR_2 + 5037 Age + 8.7 TotFltHours
- 1 80 Flight Hours -24 + 93 Ship Flight Hours -24 + 7.15 UMMHpFH
Predictor Coef StDev t-ratio P
Constant -1222738 500330 -2.44 0.017
Failed -102978 87319 -1.18 0.242
TIME IN 500 3560 0.14 0.889
Norfolk -65713 106974 -0.61 0.541
Modification -312629 74636 -4.19 0.000
Work Standard 67.04 16.99 3.95 0.000
TOURJ 318815 191312 1.67 0.100
TOUR2 301546 103501 2.91 0.005
Age 5037 1519 3.31 0.001
TotFltHours 8.65 69.95 0.12 0.902
Flight Hours-24 -179.6 214.4 -0.84 0.405
Ship Flight Hours 92.6 239.7 0.39 0.701
UMMHpFH 7.149 7.931 0.90 0.371
S = 246037 R-Sq = 53.5% R-Sq(adj) = 45.3% F - ratio = 6.53
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3 Regression Analysis for Total Direct Costs
The regression equation is
Total Direct Costs = - 1814798 - 138397 Failed + 1538 TIME IN TOUR
- 69358 Norfolk - 407079 Modification + 103 Work Standard
+ 561303 TOUR_l + 447007 TOUR_2 + 7868 Age + 6.8 TotFltHours
- 189 Flight Hours -24 + 197 Ship Flight Hours -24 + 6.5 UMMHpFH
Predictor Coef StDev t-ratio
Constant -1814798 640620 -2.83 0.006
Failed -138397 111803 -1.24 0.220
TIME IN 1538 4559 0.34 0.737
Norfolk -69358 136969 -0.51 0.614
Modification -407079 95564 -4.26 0.000
Work Standard 102.85 21.76 4.73 0.000
TOUR 1 561303 244955 2.29 0.025
TOUR_2 447007 132522 3.37 0.001
Age 7868 1946 4.04 0.000
Tot FltHours 6.80 89.56 0.08 0.940
Flight Hours-24 -188.8 274.5 -0.69 0.494
Ship Flight Hours 196.7 307.0 0.64 0.524
UMMHpFH 6.55 10.15 0.64 0.521
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